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Abstract—We present the DeepWiFi protocol, which hardens the base-
line WiFi (IEEE 802.11ac) with deep learning and sustains high through-
put by mitigating out-of-network interference. DeepWiFi is interoperable
with baseline WiFi and builds upon the existing WiFi’s PHY transceiver
chain without changing the MAC frame format. Users run DeepWiFi for i)
RF front end processing; ii) spectrum sensing and signal classification;
iii) signal authentication; iv) channel selection and access; v) power
control; vi) modulation and coding scheme (MCS) adaptation; and vii)
routing. DeepWiFi mitigates the effects of probabilistic, sensing-based,
and adaptive jammers. RF front end processing applies a deep learning-
based autoencoder to extract spectrum-representative features. Then a
deep neural network is trained to classify waveforms reliably as idle,
WiFi, or jammer. Utilizing channel labels, users effectively access idle
or jammed channels, while avoiding interference with legitimate WiFi
transmissions (authenticated by machine learning-based RF fingerprint-
ing) resulting in higher throughput. Users optimize their transmit power
for low probability of intercept/detection and their MCS to maximize
link rates used by backpressure algorithm for routing. Supported by
embedded platform implementation, DeepWiFi provides major through-
put gains compared to baseline WiFi and another jamming-resistant
protocol, especially when channels are likely to be jammed and the
signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio is low.
Index Terms—WiFi, machine learning, deep learning, dynamic spec-
trum access, RF signal processing, signal classification, signal authen-
tication.
1 INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radios provide wireless communication systems with
the capability to perceive, learn and adapt to spectrum dynamics.
The existing communication systems such as WiFi can greatly
benefit from design concepts of cognitive radio that cover various
detection, classification, and prediction tasks. These cognitive
radio tasks can be potentially performed by machine learning that
adapt with spectrum data without being explicitly programmed
[1]–[4]. In particular, deep neural networks have strong potential
to process and analyze rich spectrum data. Examples of deep
learning applications for cognitive radio tasks include modula-
tion classification with convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
[5], spectrum sensing with CNNs [6] and generative adversarial
networks (GANs) [7], and anti-jamming and power control with
feedforward neural networks (FNNs) [8], [9].
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In this paper, we present the DeepWiFi protocol that aims
to harden the baseline IEEE 802.11ac WiFi with the application
of machine learning (in particular, deep learning) to improve the
throughput performance and enhance its security in the presence
of jammers causing out-of-network interference. We consider three
types of jammers that are modeled as probabilistic, sensing-based,
or adaptive jammers. DeepWiFi leverages the advances in machine
learning algorithms supported by emerging computational capa-
bilities. The scope of DeepWiFi is to show how these algorithms
can be used to enhance the performance and security in multi-
hop mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Potential application
areas of DeepWiFi include internet-of-things (IoT), sensors, and
first responder communications. One key aspect of DeepWiFi is
to support interoperability with baseline WiFi while refraining
from any detrimental effect on baseline WiFi operations. For that
purpose, DeepWiFi uses the PHY transceiver chain of baseline
WiFi and does not change its medium access control (MAC) frame
format. The DeepWiFi protocol stack involves the physical (PHY),
link/MAC, and network layer algorithms that operate in a dis-
tributed manner. DeepWiFi supports multi-hop routing compared
to the standard use of IEEE 802.11ac that relies on access points
to connect individual nodes. As an extension, WiFi Direct can be
utilized to support multi-hop communications [10] and the IEEE
802.11s amendment is specifically designed for mesh networking
that incorporates multi-hop communications. While this paper
presents our findings using a WiFi setting, algorithms of DeepWiFi
can be extended to other frequency bands and waveforms as well.
1.1 Summary of Contributions
DeepWiFi consists of seven steps: 1) RF front end processing;
2) spectrum sensing and signal classification; 3) signal authen-
tication; 4) channel selection and access; 5) power control for
Low Probability of Intercept and low probability of detection
(LPI/LPD); 6) modulation and coding scheme (MCS) adapta-
tion; and 7) routing. The main contributions of this paper are
the algorithms in steps 1-4, namely RF front end processing;
spectrum sensing and signal classification; signal authentication;
and channel selection and access. Steps 5-7 on power control,
adaptive modulation and coding, and routing are used in other
similar protocols and included to provide the remaining function-
alities (preserving the layered architecture of the protocol stack),
implement and assess the full protocol stack, and compare its
performance with other protocols. While executing these steps,
DeepWiFi controls the selection of transmit power, MCS ID,
authenticated signal, channel ID, neighbor ID and flow ID, and
provides the selections to the IEEE 802.11ac transceiver chain.
There are three tasks that are enhanced by the use of machine
learning in the DeepWiFi protocol.
1) RF front end processing: Each user applies autoencoding to
the in-phase and quadrature (I/Q) components of the data
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2collected on sensed channels and extracts spectrum features.
The I/Q data can be collected by using additional receivers
or extracted by using firmware dispatches on existing WiFi
chips such as discussed in [11]. We show that autoencoding
achieves low reconstruction loss (0.2%) in dimensionality
reduction compared to other methods such as Principal Com-
ponent Analysis (PCA) and t-distributed Stochastic Neighbor
Embedding (t-SNE). The outputs of the RF front end pro-
cessing are input to the signal classification module.
2) Spectrum sensing and signal classification: Each user applies
deep learning (FNN or CNN) to the features obtained by RF
front end processing in order to classify each channel as idle
(I), jammed (J) or used by another WiFi device (W). We show
that both FNN and CNN achieve over 98% accuracy, whereas
the accuracy of Support Vector Machine (SVM) is limited to
66%.
3) Signal authentication: Each user applies machine learning-
based RF fingerprinting to authenticate signals. Radio hard-
ware effects on RF signals are used as features to detect
outliers. We show that the detection accuracy by Minimum
Covariance Determinant (MCD) is close to 90%, whereas
SVM and Isolation Forest can only achieve around 69%
and 70% accuracy, respectively. This signal authentication
capability of DeepWiFi protects WiFi against replay attacks.
4) Channel access: As opposed to baseline WiFi (where a user
backs off regardless of the type of interference), each user in
DeepWiFi runs the signal classification, backs off when the
interference is from another user participating in DeepWiFi
protocol, or does not back off when the interference is from a
jammer. This way, DeepWiFi users continue communications
(in a degraded mode) and still achieve a non-zero throughput
(instead of backing off) through adaptation of power, modu-
lation, and coding scheme.
In this paper, a distributed network of users running DeepWiFi
is simulated in the presence of probabilistic and sensing-based
jammers. MATLAB WLAN Toolbox is used to generate realistic
WiFi signals and channels. Simulation results show that as the
jamming effect (either intentional adversarial jamming or in the
form of out-of-network interference) increases, the throughput of
baseline WiFi drops quickly to zero, whereas DeepWiFi can reli-
ably identify channels for transmission and sustain its throughput.
For 9 users operating over 40 channels, we show that there is no
throughput loss for DeepWiFi when jamming likelihood is less
than 60% and there is only 14% throughput loss when jamming
likelihood is 80%. Finally, we show that DeepWiFi outperforms a
jamming-resistant MAC protocol called Jamming Defense (JADE)
[12] and is robust against adaptive jammers.
1.2 Related Work
Jamming and anti-jamming mechanisms with machine learning
are studied in [8], [9] in which an adversarial user builds a deep
learning based classifier to predict if there will be a successful
transmission (replied with ACK messages) or not (no ACK) using
an exploratory (inference) attack to jam data transmissions. A
transmitter in return can launch a causative attack to poison
jammer’s classifier (by adding controlled perturbations to transmit
decisions) as a defense mechanism. Similar to [8], [9], DeepWiFi
considers users with jamming capabilities. The difference is that
DeepWiFi identifies jammed channels and enables transmissions
(by adapting the MCS) even under jamming instead of backing
off (which would be the case in the baseline WiFi). There is also
a rich literature on modulation recognition studies that distinguish
signals with different modulation schemes. These related studies
include earlier work in [13], [14] that use cyclic spectrum char-
acteristics extracted from raw signal and more recent efforts in
[5], [15] that use the raw I/Q samples as inputs using CNN. Since
a frame may consist of multiple modulations (in the preamble
and data portions) and modulations may change across short
MAC frames (5.484 msec in IEEE 802.11ac [16]), the problem
in DeepWiFi is different from [5], [15] and focused on classifying
waveforms (chunked into frames) within the frame time rather
than simple modulations that remain fixed over longer periods
of time. Note that overall processing overhead for the front
end processing, signal classification, and signal authentication
of DeepWiFi is measured as 0.1546 msec (2.8% of 802.11ac
frame) to process each sample. Furthermore, we note that the
conventional energy detectors for spectrum sensing cannot be
applied in our framework because they cannot distinguish busy
and jamming signals such that an adversary can easily create a
jamming signal with the same energy characteristics to fool an
energy detector.
There are several characteristics that can be used for RF finger-
printing. One can focus on transient [17] or the steady-state [18],
[19] behavior of the transmitted signal. For example, [17] studied
the unique transient characteristics of a transmitter, which are
often attributed to RF amplifier, frequency synthesizer modules,
and modulator subsystems. The duration of the transient behavior
changes depending on the type and model of the transmitter.
Also, as a device ages, its transient behavior can change [17]. In
DeepWiFi, we opt not to use transient behavior as a feature since it
is highly susceptible to noise and interference effects and requires
precise timing of when the signal transmission has started. Instead,
DeepWiFi uses steady-state characteristics between a transmitter
and a receiver pair such as frequency and timing synchronization
offset, both of which are often attributed to the radio’s oscillator,
power amplifier, and digital-to-analog converter. There are two
relevant studies that use steady-state characteristics similar to this
paper. First, in [18], three instantaneous signal characteristics such
as the amplitude, phase, and frequency of the signal are used. After
a preprocessing step (removal of the mean and normalization),
their features (such as the variance, skewness, and kurtosis)
are extracted within predefined window sizes [18]. Second, the
frequency offset, magnitude and phase offset, distance vector, and
I/Q origin offset are used in [19] as features for RF fingerprinting,
and weighted voting classifiers and maximum likelihood classifier
are developed for fingerprinting. In DeepWiFi, we use machine
learning for signal authentication purposes.
Ad hoc networking over WiFi has two standards, namely,
the ad hoc mode in 802.11 and its successor WiFi Direct. The
ad hoc mode (IBSS) is one of the two modes of operation in
the 802.11 standard, the other mode being the commonly used
mode of infrastructure-based mode (IM-BSS). The IBSS mode
enables direct communication between any devices without the
need for an access point (AP). This standard has been evolved
to what is known as WiFi Direct that is considered to be the
main standard of ad hoc networking over WiFi, particularly, using
Android smartphones [20]. Google has developed a peer-to-peer
(P2P) framework, WiFi P2P, that complies with WiFi Direct
standard. Devices after Android 4.0 (API level 14) can discover
other devices and connect directly to each other via WiFi without
an intermediate AP, when both devices support WiFi P2P [21]. The
3APIs include calls for peer discovery, request, and connection, all
of which are defined in the WifiP2PManager class (see [21] for
more details). A related work that uses WiFi direct in ad hoc
mode and implements multi-hop routing is [10], which improves
multi-group link connectivity with low overhead. Note that WiFi
Direct, as defined in the standard, does not support multi-hop
communications, but recent work such as [10] has shown that
multi-hop routing can be implemented using WiFi Direct. With
the four novel contributions of DeepWiFi focused on PHY and
MAC layers (as highlighted in Section 2), DeepWiFi is designed
to support both single-hop and multi-hop communications. The
routing approach in DeepWiFi differs from [10] such that routing
based on the backpressure algorithm uses both queue and channel
information.
The RF preprocessing step in DeepWiFi utilizes autoencoders
[22], [23]. In the literature, there are several studies that use
autoencoders to extract features in a high dimensional space and
provide a feature representation of the data, and then train a
separate classifier using these features (e.g., [24]). In this paper,
we also use the same semi-supervised approach. Other prepos-
sessing methods such as Short Time Fourier Transformation, Choi-
Williams Transformation, and Gabor Wavelet Transformation have
been used in [25] to preprocess I/Q data before running them
through a CNN. In this paper, our preprocessing step is data-driven
and consists of a denoising autoencoder that is shown to suppress
noise in the input to the deep learning classifier and results in a
small reconstruction loss.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the system model. The DeepWiFi protocol overview
is given in Section 3. RF front end processing of DeepWiFi
is described in Section 4.1. This is followed by the descrip-
tion of spectrum sensing and signal classification of DeepWiFi
in Section 4.2. RF fingerprinting is applied in Section 4.3 to
authenticate signals in DeepWiFi. Section 4.4 describes channel
selection and channel access of DeepWiFi. It is followed by the
descriptions of power control for LPI/LPD and MCS adaptation
of DeepWiFi in Sections 4.5 and 4.6, respectively. Section 4.7
presents the routing extension of DeepWiFi. Simulation setting
is described in Section 5. Performance results of DeepWiFi and
baseline WiFi are presented in Section 6. The implementation,
overhead, and complexity aspects of DeepWiFi are discussed in
Section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
2.1 Network Setting
A wireless multi-hop network of n users is considered. Each user
may act as the source, the destination, or the relay for packet
traffic. Each source i generates unicast packets for traffic flow
sij , addressed to destination j with rate rij . While DeepWiFi
algorithms do not require synchronization, we consider slotted
time in discrete time simulation and follow the 802.11ac MAC’s
synchronization that uses the synchronizing timers in the preamble
of a frame (Non-HT Training Field [16]). Each user i holds a
separate queue (with length Qsi (t) at time slot t) for every packet
flow s. Packets in each queue are served in a first-come-first-
served (FCFS) fashion. Packets are allocated to 802.11ac MAC
frames before transmission. If the queue length is smaller than
the frame, zero padding is used for the missing data part. If the
queue length is greater than the frame, packets in the queue are
partitioned into multiple frames before transmission. There are m
channels available. At any given time slot, a user may select one
of these channels to transmit packets. Users share these channels
for data transmissions and control information exchanges. There
is no centralized controller. Users make their own decisions in a
distributed setting. There are nJ jammers that aim to interfere with
transmissions. Without loss of generality, each jammer is assigned
to one of the channels (i.e., nJ = m). There are three types of
jammers:
• Probabilistic (random) jammer: The jammer is turned on
with fixed jamming probability pJ at any given time slot.
• Static sensing-based jammer: The jammer is turned on if
it detects a signal on the channel using a constant sensing
threshold τ , else it is turned on with the probability of
jamming pJ at any given time slot.
• Adaptive jammer: This jammer is a sensing-based jammer
where channel sensing threshold is adaptively adjusted. If
the jammer senses a signal on the channel, it is turned on.
Both the static and adaptive jammers use channel sensing mea-
surements to make jamming decisions. The sensing threshold is
constant for the static sensing-based jammer, while the adaptive
jammer changes the threshold by observing the actions of the
transmitter in a given time window.
IEEE 802.11ac standard is followed for the PHY implementa-
tion and MAC frame format. The center frequency is 5.25 GHz.
The instantaneous bandwidth is 20 MHz and each OFDM sub-
carrier occupies a bandwidth of 312.5 kHz. The subcarriers can
be used independently and incoming data bits can be distributed
among the subcarriers (possibly depending on the channel fre-
quency response). Thus, a 20 MHz channel consists of 64 subcar-
riers. We allocate 8 subcarriers for pilot, 16 subcarriers as null,
and 40 subcarriers for data (i.e., m = 40).
Each user selects its MCS depending on its received SINR.
The link rate from user i to user j at time slot t is denoted by
cij(t) and depends on the selected MCS, transmit power, and
consequently the observed SINR. On each channel, the SINR at a
user depends on the channel and interference effects among users
(legitimate transmitters and jammers). Next, we describe how the
channels among users and their signals are generated.
2.2 Channel and Waveform Data Generation
We generate the physical signals and channels using the 802.11ac
library in MATLAB WLAN System Toolbox. Several channel
models are offered. Each channel model considers a different
breakpoint distance, root mean square (RMS) delay spread,
maximum delay, Rician K-factor for non-light of sight (NLOS)
conditions, number of taps, and number of clusters. Waveform
related parameters are specified to generate the signal such as
the input data bits, number of packets, packet format (VHT, HT,
etc.), idle time (added after each packet), scrambler initialization,
the number of transmit antennas, payload length, MCS, and
bandwidth using the wlanWaveformGenerator function of
the MATLAB WLAN System Toolbox. This function generates
a time-domain I/Q waveform x that goes through the chan-
nel, where small scale fading and other channel impairments
are applied. The MATLAB function used for this operation is
wlanTGacChannel and it performs an Hx operation, where H
is the channel matrix. There are several parameters that can be set
during the channel generation such as delay profile (models A-F
are shown in Table 1), sample rate, carrier frequency, transmission
4TABLE 1: Delay models.
Model
Parameter A B C D E F
Breakpoint distance (m) 5 5 5 10 20 30
RMS delay spread (ns) 0 15 30 50 100 150
Maximum delay (ns) 0 80 200 390 730 1050
Rician K-factor (dB) 0 0 0 3 6 6
Number of taps 1 9 14 18 18 18
Number of clusters 1 2 2 3 4 6
direction (uplink or downlink), the number of receive and transmit
antennas, spacing between antennas, and large-scale fading effects
(‘None’, ‘Pathloss’, ‘Shadowing’, or ‘Pathloss and Shadowing’).
Next, additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) is added to the
signal that is passed through the channel using the awgn command
of the MATLAB WLAN System Toolbox. Thus, we obtain the
channel effect Hx+ n induced on the I/Q waveform x.
3 OVERVIEW OF THE DEEP WIFI PROTOCOL
On top of 802.11ac, each user individually and asynchronously
runs the DeepWiFi protocol stack with the following seven main
steps (shown in Fig. 1):
1) RF front end processing: Each user hops among WiFi chan-
nels (one by one), collects RF signal on each sensed channel
and processes the RF signal at the RF front end to build the
I/Q data and extract features.
2) Spectrum sensing and signal classification: Each user applies
deep learning to these features (the output of the RF front
end) in order to classify (label) each channel as idle (I),
jammed (J) or used by another WiFi device (W).
3) Signal authentication: Each user applies machine learning-
based RF fingerprinting to authenticate legitimate WiFi sig-
nals at the physical layer.
4) Channel selection and channel access: Each user backs off
on any busy channel used by legitimate WiFi signals (W)
(to resolve future conflicts), selects an idle channel (I); if
none, selects a jammed channel (J) (including channels used
by the non-legitimated WiFi signals) with the best SINR for
data transmission. The use of jammed channels (when no
idle channel is available) corresponds to the degraded mode,
where a non-zero throughput can be still achieved.
5) Power control for LPI/LPD: Each user selects the transmit
power below the jammer threshold level to avoid detection
by jammers and achieve LPI/LPD.
6) Adaptive modulation and coding: There are nine possible
MCS options to choose from in 802.11ac. Each user selects
the best MCS based on the measured SINR to maximize the
achievable rate on the selected channel.
7) Routing: Each user makes the routing decision by select-
ing the flow to serve and the next hop for transmission
by applying the backpressure algorithm, which optimizes
a spectrum utility depending on traffic congestion and link
rate (computed in Step 6). Lower layers of DeepWiFi are
transparent to the routing algorithm and can be combined
with other efforts for multi-hop networking such as the
extension of WiFi Direct for multi-group networking [26].
The output of the DeepWiFi protocol is specified as:
a. TX power specifies the transmit power.
Figure 1: DeepWiFi protocol diagram with seven steps.
b. MCS ID specifies which MCS of IEEE 802.11ac is used and
its corresponding rate.
c. Authenticated signal specifies which signals belong to legiti-
mate WiFi.
d. Channel ID specifies which channel to send the next data
packet.
e. Neighbor ID specifies which neighbor to select for the next
hop transmission.
f. Flow ID specifies which application traffic flow to serve when
the data packet is transmitted.
These outputs tune parameters of the 802.11ac network proto-
col stack at each user. Specifically, outputs a-c tune the physical
layer, outputs d and e tune the link/MAC layer, and outputs f and
g tune the network layer, as shown in Fig. 1.
4 DEEPWIFI PROTOCOL STEPS
4.1 Step 1: RF Front End Processing
Input: The RF signal.
Output: The set of extracted features given to Step 2 and the I/Q
data given to Step 3.
As shown in Fig. 2, the following steps are pursued to process
the RF signal.
1) 16-bit analog-to-digital converter (ADC) is used to sample
the signal by allocating 8 bits for real and imaginary parts of
the signal.
2) The digitized signal is bandpass filtered with 20MHz in-
stantaneous bandwidth to remove interference from adjacent
bands.
3) The digitized and bandpass-filtered signal is sampled at
40MHz.
4) The deep-learning based autoencoder takes the input samples
and reduces them into latent features.
RF front end processing provides the I/Q data to Step 3 (signal
authentication) and the reduced set of features to Step 2 (spectrum
sensing and signal classification). The details of this procedure
(shown in Fig. 1) are given below:
1) Spectrum sensing and signal classification (Step 2) takes the
outputs of the autoencoder in Step 1 and classifies the input
signal as WiFi (W), Jammer (J), or Idle (I).
5Figure 2: RF front end processing of DeepWiFi (Step 1) and its
connections to Steps 2 and 3.
2) A logic takes the signal classification result as input. If the
signal is a WiFi signal, it passes the I/Q data to the phys-
ical layer authentication (RF fingerprinting) module, which
constitutes the first step of the physical layer security.
Instead of using I/Q data directly as input to the signal
classifier, we use a denoising autoencoder to extract the features of
the received signal that are then fed into the signal classifier. In an
RF environment, we typically have many unlabeled data samples
(that can be collected by sensing the spectrum) while the number
of labeled data samples (needed to train the classifier) is relatively
small compared to the dimension of each data sample (40K is the
dimension per sample in our case). However, unlabeled data can
be used to train an autoencoder that reduces the dimension of the
input data to the classifier to build a reliable classifier from few
labeled data samples. In addition, we use a denoising autoencoder
that further suppresses the noise in the input. Another benefit of
the autoencoder may be observed when the environment changes
(e.g., new channel conditions (distributions) or unknown signals
passing through known or unknown channel distributions). An
autoencoder trained with unlabeled data in the new environment
may help adapt to the effects of this new environment by robust
feature extraction. Then, a small number of labeled data samples in
the new environment could be sufficient. These capabilities would
not be achievable if we were to use the I/Q data directly as input
to the deep neural network-based classifier as we cannot train a
reliable classifier for a high-dimensional problem using a small
number of labeled training samples.
To preprocess the data, we also tried different standard tech-
niques such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [27] and t-
distributed stochastic neighbor embedding (tSNE) [28]. However,
they failed in separating signals of interest. These results are re-
ported in the Appendix. Instead, DeepWiFi uses an autoencoder to
extract features from the I/Q data. An autoencoder is a deep neural
network that is trained to reconstruct its input and consists of two
neural networks, namely, an encoder h = fθ(x) and a decoder
that produces a reconstruction r = gΦ(h), where θ is the set
of weights and biases of the neural network corresponding to the
encoder and Φ represents that of the decoder. The neural networks
f and g can be constructed as FNN or CNN. Autoencoder is used
for unsupervised learning of efficient codings. DeepWiFi uses the
autoencoder to learn a representation (encoding) for a set of data,
for the purpose of feature learning and dimensionality reduction.
In particular, DeepWiFi uses a denoising autoencoder that adds
noise to its inputs and trains it to recover the original noise-
Figure 3: Denoising autoencoder in DeepWiFi.
free inputs. This method prevents the autoencoder from trivially
copying its inputs to its outputs and the autoencoder finds the
patterns in the data, while avoiding overfitting.
The preprocessing of DeepWiFi (ADC, bandpass filtering, and
sampling) produces the I/Q data that has the dimension of 40000
(20000 for I and 20000 for Q components) for each time instant in
Step 1. DeepWiFi applies denoising autoencoder to this I/Q data,
and determines the latent features that are further fed to the signal
classifier of DeepWiFi.
The denoising autoencoder of DeepWiFi adds the Gaussian
noise to the I/Q data (to prevent overfitting) and then applies
four hidden layers (the first two layers for encoding and the
last two layers for decoding) after one initial normalization layer.
Hidden layers are trained through the backpropagation algorithm
to minimize the minimum squared error (MSE) as the loss
function. We used the hyperbolic tangent function (tanh) as the
activation function that performs f(x) = tanh(x) operation. In
a neural network, the activation function is used as an abstrac-
tion representing the rate of action potential firing in the cell.
We performed hyperparameter optimization and observed that a
Gaussian noise N with zero mean and variance of 0.1 gives the
best reconstruction loss and avoids overfitting. DeepWiFi uses the
following autoencoder structure:
• Hidden layer 1: FNN with 534 neurons and tanh activation.
• Hidden layer 2: FNN with 66 neurons and tanh activation.
• Hidden layer 3: FNN with 534 neurons and tanh activation.
• Hidden layer 4: FNN with 40000 neurons and tanh activa-
tion.
The input and output layers have the same dimension.
A denoising autoencoder adds a Gaussian noise N with 0
mean and variance of σ2 to the input data samples X . The
resulting data Xnoisy = X + N is input to the neural network.
Denoising autoencoder solves the following loss function:
(Φ∗, θ∗) = min
(Φ,θ)
EX [||gΦ(fθ(Xnoisy))−X||2], (1)
where EX [·] denotes the expectation over X and || · ||2 is
the `2-norm (the Euclidean norm). The structure of denoising
autoencoder is shown in Fig. 3.
We implemented a denoising autoencoder using the Tensor-
Flow framework, which takes the input I/Q data and reduces its
dimensions. These features represent the latent variables (extracted
features). The reconstruction loss between the original signal X
and the reconstructed signal Xˆ is computed by E[||X − Xˆ||2].
To find the best parameters, we performed a hyperparameter op-
timization using the Hyperband framework [29]. This framework
can provide over an order-of-magnitude speedup over Bayesian
hyperparameter optimization methods. The Hyperband randomly
samples a set of hyperparameter configurations, evaluates the
performances of all current configurations, sorts the score of
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Figure 4: Training and test losses during denoising autoencoder
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configurations, and removes the worst scoring configurations
(successive halving). The process is repeated progressively with
increasing number of iterations. Therefore, only the configurations
that yield good results are evaluated thoroughly. Note that we
use Hyperband to optimize the parameters of neural networks de-
scribed in Sections 4.1-4.2. We considered the maximum amount
of resources that can be allocated to a single configuration as 81
iterations and a downsampling rate of three (η = 3). The dataset
used in the training of the denoising autoencoder consists of equal
number of WiFi, jammer, and noise signals. The dataset is divided
into 80% and 20% splits for the training and test sets, respectively.
We use a batch size of 64 samples. Fig. 4 depicts the loss in
the training and test sets during the training process. We observe
that the loss gradually decreases in both sets and no overfitting is
observed.
Fig. 5 illustrates the legitimate WiFi signal in the test set and its
reconstruction. We observe the noise suppression on the sidebands
up to 10 dB. This highlights the effect of denoising autoencoder
on the noise reduction. Note that a similar denoising effect using
denoising autoencoders has been reported in the image processing
[30] and Fig. 5 shows the same effect in the RF domain.
The output of the autoencoder is the set of extracted features
that are given to the classifier in Step 2.
4.2 Step 2: Spectrum Sensing and Signal Classification
Input: The I/Q data on the sensed channel from Step 1.
Output: The classification of the channel to idle, used by WiFi or
jammed, given as input to Step 3.
Each user applies a deep neural network-based classifier to the
received I/Q data on the sensed channel and classifies the captured
signal as noise (idle), WiFi signal, or jammer signal. Features are
the I/Q data received over time (output of Step 1). There are three
potential labels assigned to each channel: idle (I), another WiFi
device (W), and jammed (J). Training data is collected offline
and training is performed offline. The trained classifier is loaded
to each user offline. Only neural network weights and biases are
stored in the memory. Each radio individually runs its classifier
online.
4.2.1 Signal Classes (I), (W) and (J)
For training and testing phases, signals of each label are generated
as follows:
1) Noise: The background noise for WiFi is between −80 dB
and −100 dB. To emulate such a case, we choose a number
uniformly at random between −80 dB and −100 dB in the
frequency domain and then take the inverse Fourier transform
to obtain the time samples. The output is stored in the training
data as the background noise samples with label (I).
2) WiFi Legitimate Signal: We use the MATLAB WLAN Sys-
tem Toolbox to generate the WiFi signal including the pream-
ble and payload. We consider the following parameters:
a) Center frequency: 5.25 GHz,
b) Channel Bandwidth: 20 MHz,
c) TX-RX distance: 5m (default value; we vary the SINR in
simulations),
d) Normalize Path Gains: True,
e) Transmit antenna spacing: 0.5 wavelength (default),
f) Receive antenna spacing: 0.5 wavelength (default),
g) Packet format: VHT,
h) Scrambler initialization: 93 (default),
i) Channel coding: BCC (binary convolutional coding),
j) APEP Length: 1,
k) PSDU Length: 36 (default; PSDU length is the number of
bytes carried in the user payload. For a single user, the
PSDU length is scalar integer from 1 to 220 − 1),
l) Long guard interval length: 800 ns,
m) Short guard interval length: 400 ns,
n) A-MPDU Length: 256 bytes,
o) Number of transmit antennas: 1,
p) Number of spatial streams transmitted: 1, and
q) MCS: Varying between 0-9.
We generate channel coefficients using the specific channel
model (as discussed in Section 2.2) and pass the WiFi signal
through the channel. Then, we add white Gaussian noise. The
output is stored in the training data as the WiFi signal samples
with label (W).
3) Jammer Signal: In the time domain, we first generate nor-
mally distributed random numbers with zero mean and vari-
ance of one. Then we up-sample these samples to a selected
carrier with a bandwidth that is the same as the WiFi signal.
We generate channel coefficients using the same channel
models discussed in Section 2.2 and pass the jammer signal
through the channel. Then, we add white Gaussian noise.
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samples with label (J).
12000 samples are generated using different channel models.
80% of data is used for training and 20% is allocated to testing.
Training data set includes signals generated under six different
channel conditions (2000 samples per channel model).
4.2.2 Simple Machine Learning Classifiers
For benchmark comparison, we evaluate the performance of SVM
classifier in signal classification. As its performance depends on
the kernel type and hyperparameters used, the hyperparameters
are tuned for the best accuracy. Two of the most common kernels,
linear kernel and radial basis function (RBF) kernel, are used. For
the RBF kernel, there are two parameters that are considered, C
and γ. The parameter C is common in all SVM kernel types and it
trades off misclassification of training examples against simplicity
of decision surface. When C is a small number, the decision
surface is smoother, and a high C puts more emphasis on classi-
fying all training examples correctly. So C trades error penalty for
stability. The second parameter γ is the free parameter of Gaussian
RBF, K(xi, xj) = exp(−γ||xi−xj ||2)) where γ > 0. It defines
the influence of each training example. A larger γ has smaller
variance affecting only the closer neighbors. For hyperparameter
tuning, C = [0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1.0, 10.0, 100.0, 1000.0]
is used for linear kernel, and γ with the same C values for the
Gaussian RBF kernel. In the evaluation step, we implement k-fold
cross-validation to calculate cross-validation accuracy and set k as
10. Using a grid search, we obtain the score of best performing
model. The best performance is achieved using RBF kernel with
C = 1.0 and γ = 0.1, which achieves only 66% accuracy.
4.2.3 Deep Learning Classifiers
We design two deep neural networks architectures, FNN and
CNN, for the signal classification task that achieves small memory
footprint, high accuracy, and low inference time. These deep
neural networks are implemented in TensorFlow using the Keras
library [31]. Backpropagation is applied to train the neural net-
work using a cross entropy loss function that is defined as
L = −∑mi=1 βi log(yi), where β = {βi}mi=1 is a binary
indicator of ground truth such that for a sample from label k,
βk = 1 whereas the other entries are all zeros. The neural network
prediction is denoted by y = {yi}mi=1. In both architectures, we
used the ADAM optimizer [32] with the learning rate of 10−5.
4.2.4 FNN
We tune the hyperparameters of the FNN (such as the number
of layers, number of neurons per layer and activation functions).
We use rectified linear unit (ReLU) as the activation function on
neural network layer outputs that performs the f(x) = max(0, x)
operation. The advantages of using ReLU activation function is
that it is a bit faster to compute than other activation functions in
hardware and its does not suffer from vanishing gradient problem
since it does not saturate for positive values, as opposed to
the logistic function and hyperbolic tangent function [33]. The
resulting FNN consists of the following layers:
• Fully connected layer with 15 neurons (ReLU activation).
• Dropout layer with 50% dropout probability.
• Fully connected layer with 3 neurons (Softmax activation).
It uses the dropout layer to drop out some neuron outputs from
the previous layer of a neural network and serves the purpose
TABLE 2: Confusion matrix for the FNN.
Predicted Label
(I) (W) (J)
(I) 35.6% 0.0% 0.0%
True Label (W) 0.0% 32.4% 0.5%
(J) 0.1% 0.75% 30.75%
TABLE 3: Confusion matrix for the CNN.
Predicted Label
(I) (W) (J)
(I) 35.6% 0% 0%
True Label (W) 0.1 % 31.6% 1.0%
(J) 0% 0.9 % 30.8%
of regularization for reducing overfitting by preventing complex
co-adaptations on training data. For the output layer, softmax ac-
tivation function fi(x) = exi/(
∑
j e
xj ) is used at the final layer
of the neural network. Softmax activation function is generally
a good choice for classification tasks for which output classes
are mutually exclusive. FNN achieves the average accuracy of
98.75% in predicting the correct signal labels. The confusion
matrix for FNN is shown in Table 2.
4.2.5 CNN
We tune the hyperparameters of the CNN. The resulting CNN
consists of the following layers:
• Five cascades of the following layers concatenated:
– A 2-D convolutional layer with 32 filters and kernel
sizes of (2,5).
– A 2-D convolutional layer with 32 filters and kernel
sizes of (2,5).
– Max pooling layer with kernel size of (2,2) and
stride of (2,2).
– Batch normalization layer.
• Fully connected layer with 18 neurons.
• Dropout layer with a 50% dropout probability.
• Fully connected layer with 3 neurons.
The 2-D convolutional layer is used to apply sliding filters to
the input. This layer convolves the input by moving the filters
along the input vertically and horizontally, computing the dot
product of the weights and the input, and then adding a bias term.
The max pooling layer is used to progressively reduce the spatial
size of the representation to reduce the number of parameters
and amount of computation in the network, and hence to control
overfitting. The max pooling layer performs down-sampling by
dividing the input into rectangular pooling regions, and computing
the maximum of each region. The batch normalization layer is
used to normalize each input channel across a mini-batch. The
purpose is to speed up the training of CNN and reduce the
sensitivity to network initialization. CNN achieves the average
accuracy of 98.0% in predicting the signal labels. The confusion
matrix for CNN is shown in Table 3.
4.3 Step 3: Signal Authentication
Input: I/Q data from RF front end processing (Step 1) and channel
label from spectrum sensing and signal classification (Step 2).
8Output: Set of authorized signals (to be given to the WiFi receiver
chain).
The goal of physical layer authentication (illustrated in Fig. 2)
is to augment the standard WiFi security (at Layer 2) at the
physical layer by providing physical layer fingerprinting capa-
bility for processing I/Q data and authenticate legitimate users.
RF fingerprinting is motivated by mitigating replay attacks in
wireless networks. Recent open-source firmware patches [11]
enable the capability to store and transmit I/Q data in buffer. A
software-defined radio (SDR) can also perform replay attacks by
listening to the legitimate communication between two parties and
replaying the I/Q data with the legitimate WiFi characteristics. In
such a case, signal classification may not be enough for signal
authentication, and RF characteristics in the signal transmitted by
an adversary can be used to authenticate the signal in the PHY
layer. Note that this step uses the I/Q data directly, not the features
extracted by the autoencoder, as hardware impairments used in
the authentication may be lost at the autoencoder. Therefore, I/Q
data is directly used in this step. The details of this authentication
procedure (shown in Fig. 2) are given below:
1) Spectrum sensing and signal classification (Step 2) takes the
outputs of the autoencoder in Step 1 and classifies the input
signal as WiFi (W), Jammer (J), or Idle (I).
2) A logic takes the signal classification result as input. If the
signal is a WiFi signal, it passes the I/Q data to the physical
layer authentication (RF fingerprinting), which constitutes the
first step of the physical layer security.
3) The physical layer authentication uses the physical layer im-
pairments that are inherent in each transmitter and authorizes
if it detects that the received signal comes from a legitimate
transmitter.
4) If the received signal is authorized, the signal is processed by
the WiFi receiver chain.
The objective is to analyze RF signal characteristics to authen-
ticate legitimate WiFi users. One way of RF fingerprinting is based
on location identification by capturing channel specific features
(such as the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) levels).
However, this approach does not effectively apply to mobile users
with rapidly changing RSSI levels. Another way of RF finger-
printing is based on identification using radio characteristics that
are divided into waveform domain and hardware domain charac-
teristics (impairments). The waveform domain approach identifies
transient-based behavior that lasts for a very short period of time
(microseconds) and is hard to model. The transient characteristics
are also prone to noise and interference effects. The hardware
domain approach is based on capturing hardware impairments
such as frequency, magnitude and phase errors, I/Q offset and
synchronization offsets in the time and frequency domains. We
pursue this second approach.
To authenticate a signature, we use a two-layer approach (as
shown in Fig. 6):
1) Outlier detection determines if the signature belongs to any
signature that is authenticated or not. If the signature is not
authenticated, it is rejected. If the signature belongs to an
authenticated user, then we proceed to next step.
2) Classification validates the signature belongs to the transmit-
ter that it claims. The classifier returns a user ID that is stored.
When the data preamble is decoded, we verify that the sender
and the output of the classifier (user ID) match.
Figure 6: Two-layer approach for RF fingerprinting.
In what follows, we describe the PHY-layer impairment model,
feature extraction, data generation, and authentication steps.
4.3.1 Modeling the PHY-layer impairments
Training data is generated in MATLAB to account for different
hardware impairments. In particular, the sampling rate offset,
carrier frequency offset, and I/Q balance offset (amplitude and
phase) are taken into consideration. To model the sample rate
offset (SRO) between the transmitter and receiver, the transmitted
waveform is resampled with a factor of p/q times the original
sample rate where p and q are the interpolation and decima-
tion factors. These parameters are varied for each transmitter-
receiver pair. We use the resample function of MATLAB. A
frequency offset is introduced to the previous signal using the
helperFrequencyOffset function of MATLAB. This joint
SRO and carrier frequency offset impairments are suggested in
[34]. Finally, for each transmitter-receiver pair, a constant I/Q
offset is added by an amount of ψ for amplitude imbalance and φ
for phase imbalance using the following formulation [35]:
κI = 10
0.5ψ/20 (2)
κQ = 10
−0.5ψ/20 (3)
imbI = IRe{txSig) · κI · exp(−0.5i · φpi/180) (4)
imbQ = IIm(txSig) · κQ · exp(i(pi/2 + 0.5φpi/180)) (5)
rxSig = imbI + imbQ, (6)
where txSig and rxSig are the transmitted and received signals,
respectively, κI and κQ are the in-phase and quadrature gains,
respectively, imbI and imbQ are the in-phase and quadrature
imbalances, respectively, the amplitude imbalance ψ is given in
dB, and phase imbalance φ is given in degrees. An example is
shown in Fig. 7, where SRO is denoted by ω and CRO is the
carrier frequency offset.
4.3.2 Extracting the features from signal waveform
Next, we extract the signal features and obtain a fin-
gerprint signature of each waveform. We first detect the
I/Q imbalance using the MATLAB Communication Tool-
box’s comm.IQImbalanceCompensator and obtain a com-
pensator coefficient IQComp. The I/Q coefficients are esti-
mated using iqcoef2imbal, which computes the ampli-
tude and phase imbalances given a compensator coefficient.
We also need to extract the synchronization in frequency
and time domains. The frequency-domain synchronization has
two components called the coarse and fine offsets. The time
domain synchronization has only one component. We use
wlanCoarseCFOEstimate, wlanFineCFOEstimate, and
wlanSymbolTimingEstimate functions of MATLAB to es-
timate the coarse and fine center frequency offset, and symbol
timing synchronization, respectively. Through these steps, we
9obtain five signatures: Coarse center frequency offset, fine center
frequency offset, symbol timing synchronization, amplitude im-
balance, and phase imbalance. Note that to extract these features,
we have used domain knowledge rather than following a purely
data-driven approach. This is due to the fact that hardware impair-
ments introduce very subtle changes in the received signal such
that domain knowledge is required to provide a robust algorithm.
4.3.3 Data generation
As a comprehensive dataset, we generate 50 signal samples at
SNR values from 5 to 25 dB in 5 dB increments for each subband.
The same experiment is repeated for 10 users. To introduce the
frequency offset impairments, we consider the SRO between a
transmitter and receiver pair j to be a multiple of 100 parts per
million (PPM), i.e. ωj = 100j PPM as suggested in [34]. For this
purpose, we take the interpolation factor as p = 104 and vary the
decimation factor q = p − j for each user j corresponding to a
SRO of user j as ωj = (1 − p/(p − j))106 PPM. Note that if
the offsets are larger, RF fingerprint signatures will be easier to
differentiate. These offsets are kept constant throughout different
SNR and channel realizations. To introduce amplitude and phase
imbalance, 1 dB and 10 degrees increments are added between
users such that jth user has j dB and 10× j degrees imbalance.
4.3.4 Outlier detection
To authorize the signals, we first use a simple outlier detection
method in which the objective is to identify which signatures are
authorized and which are not. We test and evaluate the perfor-
mance of three different methods: (i) one-class SVM [36], (ii)
isolation forest [37], and (iii) Minimum Covariance Determinant
(MCD) [38], [39] methods. Our results show that MCD, also
known as the elliptic envelope method, outperforms the other two
methods. In what follows, we briefly describe all three methods
and then present the performance evaluation results.
• One-class SVM is an unsupervised outlier detection
method. It learns a frontier delimiting the contour of
initial observations. If a new observation lays within the
frontier-delimited subspace, it is as coming from the same
population (an authorized signature). Otherwise, if they
lay outside the frontier, it is an outlier (an unauthorized
signature). The parameter ν is the margin of the One-Class
SVM that determines the probability of finding a new, but
regular, observation outside the frontier.
• Isolation forest isolates observations by randomly select-
ing a feature and then randomly selecting a split value be-
tween the maximum and minimum values of the selected
feature. This recursive partitioning can be represented by
a tree structure and the number of splittings required to
isolate a sample is equivalent to the path length from
the root user to the terminating user. This path length,
averaged over a forest of such random trees, is a measure
of normality and our decision function.
• MCD fits an elliptic envelope such that any data
point outside the ellipse is an outlier. It is a highly
robust estimator of multivariate distributions [38]. It
uses the Mahalanobis distance such that MD(x) =√
(x− µx)TΣ−1x (x− µx), where µx and Σ−1x are the
mean and covariance of data x.
Suppose there are ten signatures, six of which are authorized
and four are unauthorized (unseen) signatures. Table 4 presents
Figure 7: WiFi signal with and without hardware impairments.
TABLE 4: Confusion matrix for MCD. “A” stands for authenti-
cated and “O” stands for outlier.
Predicted Label
(A) (O)
(A) 29.3% 10.2%
True Label (O) 0% 60.5%
TABLE 5: Confusion matrix for the one-class SVM method.
Predicted Label
(A) (O)
(A) 22.8% 16.7%
True Label (O) 13.3% 47.2%
TABLE 6: Confusion matrix for the Isolation Forest outlier detec-
tion method.
Predicted Label
(A) (O)
(A) 15.1% 24.4%
True Label (O) 6.5% 54.0%
the confusion matrix of MCD outlier detection that achieves the
average accuracy of 89.8%. We also present the confusion matrix
of one-class SVM with ν = 0.2 and isolation forest methods
in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. The two classifiers achieve only
70.0% and 69.1% accuracy, respectively, in the same order as
before. In Step 2, we use supervised classification and employ
RBF-kernel based SVM with C = 1 and γ = 0.1 parameters,
which achieves 100% accuracy.
4.4 Step 4: Channel Selection and Channel Access
Input: The set of channel labels and SINR from Step 2.
Output: The ID of the channel selected for transmission.
Each user individually starts scanning the set of m channels
(with a random initialization) and classifies each channel as (I),
(W) or (J) with the deep learning-based classifier (as described in
Step 3).
1) If channel i is classified as (I), the user transmits and breaks
the scanning loop.
2) Else if channel i is classified as (W), the user backs-off (with
exponential timer) and counts down from 2k − 1 (where k is
the timer window).
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TABLE 7: MCSs and corresponding rates for IEEE 802.11ac with
one spatial stream (GI stands for guard interval).
Data Rate (Mb/s)
MCS Modulation Coding 800 ns GI 400 ns GI
0 BPSK 1/2 6.5 7.2
1 QPSK 1/2 13.0 14.4
2 QPSK 3/4 19.5 21.7
3 16-QAM 1/2 26.0 28.9
4 16-QAM 3/4 39.0 43.3
5 64-QAM 2/3 52.0 57.8
6 64-QAM 3/4 58.5 65.0
7 64-QAM 5/6 65.0 72.2
8 256-QAM 3/4 78.0 86.7
3) Else if channel i is classified as (J), it is added to a possible
list for data transmission and the user scans the next channel.
Note that the third step does not exist in the baseline WiFi
that treats channels (W) and (J) the same way and backs off on
all of these channels. At the end of scanning channels, each user
performs the following:
1) If there is no (I) channel (channels are either (W) and (J)), the
user selects the channel (J) with the best SINR and transmits
2) If there is no channel (I) and (J), i.e., all channels are (W),
while back-off counter is not zero, the user waits for one time
slot and reduces all counters by 1.
3) If any back-off counter is zero, the user senses that channel.
• If the channel is (I), the user transmits on that channel.
• Else, the user resets the back-off counter and uni-
formly selects a random number between 0 and
2k+1 − 1.
4.5 Step 5: Power Control for LPI/LPD
Input: The ID and SINR of the selected channel from Step 4.
Output: The transmit power given to the WiFi transmitter chain.
Each DeepWiFi user reduces its power to the minimum to meet the
minimum SINR requirement to its intended receiver for LPI/LPD
capability, assuming the channel estimation from itself to its
intended receiver is carried out periodically. Consider a user i with
the chosen transmit power Pi and jammer j with sensing threshold
τj , and let hij denote the pathloss from user i to jammer j. Then
jammer j cannot detect transmission of user i if Pihij < τj . Note
that τj and hij are unknown to user i.
4.6 Step 6: Adaptive Modulation and Coding
Input: The ID and SINR of the selected channel from Step 4.
Output: The MCS level and the corresponding rate for this channel
given to the WiFi transmitter chain.
Each user selects the modulation and coding rate for 802.11ac
based on the SINR that is measured on the sensed channel. We
consider the MCSs defined for the Very High Throughput (VHT)
scheme of 802.11ac, as shown in Table 7.
We label the generated samples at the receiver with the MCS
scheme that gives the best error rate and throughput trade-off.
By design, we want lower MCS level (index) for lower SINR
and higher MCS level for higher SINR. This approach provides
an effective link adaptation. We determine a table that assigns
the best MCS for a given SINR. This table is pre-loaded to each
user that adapts its MCS according to the measured SINR. To
build up this table, we initially generate the transmitted signal
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Figure 8: Best selection of MCS levels at different SINRs for
different payloads.
using a high MCS level. We transmit the signal over the channel
and add noise. We estimate the channel at the receiver using the
preamble and equalize the signal. The equalized samples are then
used to demodulate the signal. Thus, we obtain the packet error
rate by comparing the transmitted and received bits. If the packet
error rate is not zero, we reduce the MCS level and repeat the
same procedure. If there are still erroneous bits at the receiver for
MCS 0, then we keep the MCS as 0. Fig. 8 shows the best MCS
levels (when 256, 512, and 1024 bytes of data payload are used,
respectively) to maximize the rate depending on the SINR.
4.7 Step 7: Routing
Input: The set of link rates (given from Step 6) from a given user
to its neighbors (note that the set of queue lengths of the user
and its neighbors are obtained through information exchange in
Step 7).
Output: The ID of the flow to serve and the ID of the neighbor
selected for next-hop transmission.
Each user applies the backpressure algorithm [40] in a dis-
tributed setting without any centralized controller. Note that an-
other wireless routing algorithm can be also applied here. We
use the backpressure algorithm to reflect both channel and queue
information in routing decisions that make use of the optimized
link rates from Step 6. Each user exchanges local information on
its spectrum utility with its neighbors [41]. Each user i keeps a
separate queue for each flow s with backlog Qsi (t) at time t. For
all links, the user chooses the flow to transmit as the one with
the maximum difference of queue backlogs at the receiving and
transmitting ends, i.e., for each link (i, j) a user i chooses the flow
s∗ij = argmaxs [Q
s
i (t)−Qsj(t)]+, (7)
where [·]+ = max (·, 0). Then, we define the spectrum utility
Uij(t) = cij(t)
[
Q
s∗ij
i (t)−Q
s∗ij
j (t)
]+
(8)
for user i transmitting to user j, where cij(t) is the rate on link
(i, j) at time t (depending on transmit power from Step 5 and
MCS from Step 6). User i transmits to the selected neighbor j∗(t)
that yields the maximum spectrum utility, i.e.,
j∗(t) = argmax
j∈Ni
Uij(t), (9)
where Ni is the set of the next hop candidates for user i to
select from. Each user uses the data channel (in-band) to exchange
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control information with its neighbors. There is no separate control
channel. Users asynchronously make decisions in a distributed
setting by using the following four phases [41]:
1) neighborhood discovery and channel estimation,
2) exchange of flow information updates and execution of the
backpressure algorithm,
3) transmission decision negotiation, and
4) data transmission.
5 SIMULATION SETTING FOR NETWORK-LEVEL
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
There are n = 9 users,m = 40 channels, and 5 flows generated at
each simulation time. There are nJ = 40 jammers, each assigned
to one channel. Each random jammer is independently turned on
with the probability of jamming pJ on every simulation time,
where pJ is varied between 0 to 1 with 0.05 increments. The
received SINR (due to jammer and noise) is also varied with 1 dB
increments. Each user i generates traffic to a randomly selected
destination j. The traffic rate is randomly selected from [0, 1]
Mb/s with average rate rij = 500 kbps for a source-destination
pair (i, j). The simulator is implemented in MATLAB. Simulation
time is 100 seconds. The baseline WiFi features are implemented
using the MATLAB WLAN System Toolbox. The deep learning
code is implemented in TensorFlow.
We compare the performance of DeepWiFi with the baseline
WiFi (without deep learning or jamming resistance) and jamming-
resistant MAC protocol JADE [12]. JADE is asymptotically opti-
mal in the presence of adaptive adversarial jamming. As the base-
line WiFi is not designed to mitigate any jamming, its comparison
with DeepWiFi quantifies the effect of jamming defense. In Deep-
WiFi, we use the exponential backoff defined in the IEEE 802.11ac
standard. The comparison of DeepWiFi with JADE quantifies the
difference in the channel access and different solutions spaces.
Channel access in JADE does not differentiate between a WiFi or
a jamming signal, whereas DeepWiFi does. Therefore, the solution
spaces are different. We show that DeepWiFi achieves major
performance improvement over the baseline WiFi and JADE. In
all three algorithms, we use adaptive modulation and coding and
backpressure routing algorithm for a fair comparison.
The network topology is shown in Figure 9 where we deployed
nine users uniformly at random over a given area. Since friendly
users do not interfere with each other due to the backoff mech-
anism and signal classification, their locations do not affect the
system performance. The friendly users (DeepWiFi or baseline
WiFi) are labeled with IDs 1-9. Each link represents the set of
neighbors (depending on the SINR threshold less than 0 dB). The
40 jammers are depicted as users without links on the right and top
of Figure 9 (with user ID 10-49). Each jammer is responsible to
jam a single channel (out of 40 channels). For instance, jammers
with ID 10, 11, 12 would respectively jam channels 1, 2, 3 and so
on. When the jammer is on (off), it is depicted as a red (blue) user.
Consider the following metrics to measure the performance:
1) Average throughput (Mb/s) per user: The average throughput
rate that each user can achieve during the simulation.
2) Cumulative throughput: The average throughput of the net-
work for all users during the simulation.
Figure 9: Network topology for simulations.
6 PERFORMANCE RESULTS
6.1 Probabilistic (random) jammer
First, we fix the SINR to 0 dB and start with random jammers.
The throughput of individual users (when pJ = 0.7) for fixed
SINR (0 dB) is shown in Figure 10. The end-to-end network
throughput is shown in Figure 11 as a function of pJ . For small pJ ,
both DeepWiFi and baseline WiFi achieve the same throughput,
since all users can find idle channels without internal or external
interference. JADE is run with its default parameters according
to [12]. Due to its small channel access probability initialization,
JADE starts off worse than the baseline WiFi and DeepWiFi. As
pJ increases beyond 0.3, the throughput of baseline WiFi starts
dropping sharply, while DeepWiFi sustains its throughput and
provides major throughput gains relative to baseline WiFi. For
pJ ≥ 0.5, JADE resists to jamming better than the baseline WiFi
by adjusting the channel access probability and outperforms it
while performing worse than DeepWiFi. Even when all channels
are jammed all the time (with pJ = 1), DeepWiFi can achieve
the network end-to-end throughput close to 70 Mbs, while the
throughputs of baseline WiFi and JADE are zero (note that fluctu-
ations are due to randomness in channels and interference effects).
DeepWiFi activates more links than baseline WiFi and JADE, as
users back off on the jammed channels in both schemes, whereas
DeepWiFi allows users to transmit on the jammed channels (if no
idle channel available) in the degraded mode. We start changing
the SINR due to jammer and noise effects. The cumulative
throughput is shown in Fig. 12 as a function of SINR at pJ = 0.8.
The cumulative throughput slowly increases with SINR for all
schemes and DeepWiFi outperforms others over all SINRs. Also,
note that the cumulative throughput term in this paper accounts
for multiple hops across the network and represents the end-to-
end network throughput.
6.2 Static sensing-based jammer
So far, we considered random (probabilistic) jammers that are
turned on with some fixed probability. Next, we evaluate the effect
of sensing-based jammers and the performance of power control
for LPI/LPD. Here, we consider a static jammer that has a constant
sensing threshold τ , whereas an adaptive jammer (discussed in
Section 6.3 can dynamically adjust its sensing threshold. Let r(n)k
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Figure 10: Throughput of individual users (when pJ = 0.7) for
fixed SINR (0 dB).
Figure 11: Cumulative throughput as a function of pJ for fixed
SINR (0 dB).
Figure 12: Cumulative throughput as a function of SINR for pj =
0.8.
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Figure 13: Individual throughput (Mb/s) of DeepWiFi and baseline
WiFi when sensing-based jammers are on, pJ = 0.7 and τJ =
10 dB.
denote the jammer’s received signal on channel n at time k. The
static sensing-based jammer turns on if it detects a signal on the
channel greater than or equal to a threshold τ , that is r(n)i ≥ τ ,
else it is turned on with a fixed probability of jamming, pJ .
In our experiments, the power detection threshold of sensing-
based jammer is varied from 2 dB to 10 dB with 1 dB incre-
ments. Fig. 13 shows the average individual throughput (Mb/s)
of DeepWiFi, JADE, and baseline when sensing-based jammers
are on, pJ = 0.7 and τJ = 5 dB. We observe that the sensing-
based jammer reduces the throughput of baseline WiFi to zero
as users end up backing off indefinitely. Next, we present the
results for transmit power control to DeepWiFi to demonstrate the
LPI/LPD capability. DeepWiFi with transmit power control for
LPI/LPD can avoid jammers by operating below τJ . Fig. 14 shows
the histogram of transmit power per user. We observe that about
half of the transmissions are with low power to provide LPI/LPD
capability, whereas the other half are with high power to support
communication over the jammed channels. As a result, Deep-
WiFi with LPI/LPD can achieve higher rates higher compared
to baseline WiFi, JADE, and DeepWiFi without LPI/LPD. Fig. 15
shows the average individual throughput (Mb/s) of DeepWiFi and
baseline WiFi when sensing-based jammers are on, pJ = 0.7,
τJ = 2 dB, and the transmit power is adjusted for LPI/LPD.
We observe that as the jammer becomes more reactive, i.e., the
detection threshold of jammer τJ decreases from 10 dB to 2 dB,
the throughput of DeepWiFi and JADE decrease while the baseline
WiFi’s throughput diminishes completely.
We also evaluate DeepWiFi when there are more users than
available channels. We consider 9 users and 9 traffic flows sharing
6 channels. Figure 16 presents the cumulative throughput as a
function of jamming probability pJ for DeepWiFi, baseline WiFi,
and JADE. We observe a linear decrease in cumulative throughput
as the jamming probability increases. Note that the cumulative
throughput of DeepWiFi depends on the jamming probability,
the number of users, number of channels, backoff mechanism,
jamming power, and signal classification accuracy. Comparing
Fig. 11 and Fig. 16, we observe that the slope of cumulative
throughput versus jamming probability shows logarithmic-like
behavior when there are fewer users than channels, whereas the
slope is almost linear when there are more users than channels
(i.e., effect of congestion increases).
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Figure 14: The transmit power is adjusted for LPI/LPD.
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Figure 15: Individual throughput (Mb/s) of DeepWiFi and baseline
WiFi when sensing-based jammers are on, pJ = 0.7, SINR is 5
dB, τJ = 2 dB, and the transmit power is adjusted for LPI/LPD.
Figure 16: Cumulative throughput (Mb/s) as a function of pJ when
the number of channels is less than the number of users in the
presence of static sensing-based jammers.
Figure 17: Cumulative throughput (Mb/s) as a function of pJ in
the presence of adaptive jammers.
6.3 Adaptive jammer
Next, we consider the adaptive jammer that dynamically adjusts
the sensing threshold τt at time t by observing the channel access
patterns of WiFi users. The channel utilization on channel n (as
the jammer perceives it) at time k is 1(r(n)k ≥ τk), where 1(x)
denotes the indicator function, that is, 1 when x is True and 0
otherwise. At time t, the adaptive jammer’s utility function that
includes the channel utilization and its own power consumption is
defined as
g(r(t), p(t)) =
1
T0
t∑
k=t−T0+1
N∑
n=1
(
1(r
(n)
k ≥ τk) + w · pk
)
,
(10)
where pk is the jamming power at time k and w ≥ 0 is a
weighting constant to balance the tradeoff between jammer power
consumption and WiFi channel utilization. The vectors r(t) and
p(t) denote the received signal and transmit power values of the
jammer, respectively, over a time window of T0 time instances
ending at time t and N channels, namely r(t) = {r(n)k , 1 ≤ n ≤
N, t− T0 + 1 ≤ k ≤ t} and p(t) = {pk, t− T0 + 1 ≤ k ≤ t}.
At time t, the jammer transmits when its received signal on
channel n is greater than or equal to its sensing threshold, namely
r
(n)
t ≥ τt. Using a sufficiently small step size constant ∆ > 0, the
adaptive jammer updates its sensing threshold as τt+1 = τt + ∆t
if g(r(t− 1), p(t− 1)) > g(r(t), p(t)), else τt+1 =
[
τt − ∆t
]+
.
Fig. 17 shows the performance of DeepWiFi, baseline, and
JADE under adaptive jamming. We took the initial sensing thresh-
old as τ0 = 1, weighting constant as w = 1, and step size constant
∆ = 0.5. We observe that the cumulative throughput reduces
significantly in the presence of adaptive jammers in all cases,
while DeepWiFi still provides the best performance compared to
the baseline WiFi and JADE.
Overall, the results evaluated in the presence of three different
types of jammers indicate that DeepWiFi provides reliable and
robust communication.
7 IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLEXITY, AND OVER-
HEAD ASPECTS
DeepWiFi can be implemented in the kernel or in the WiFi card.
Open-source firmwares such as Nexmon [11] can extract the I/Q
data out of the WiFi such that the I/Q data can be processed in
the kernel. System-on-chip (SOC) solutions built for IoT such as
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Qualcomm QCS603 / QCS605 [42] can be also used to extract
the I/Q data that can be processed in the kernel (or can be moved
to an additional FPGA or ARM for further processing). These
SOCs include 802.11ac WiFi and a neural processing engine
(for deep learning) integrated in the chip that can be used for
RF communication and deep learning. The training is usually
performed offline and the trained models are ported to the kernel
or to the other platforms for inference.
DeepWiFi can get the training data in two possible ways.
First, channels and signals can be generated by MATLAB WLAN
Toolbox (as discussed in Section 2.2), and they can be used to
build the training data. Second, a real 802.11.ac WiFi card can be
used to make over-the-air transmissions that are captured by an
SDR, and the channels and signals can be used for training.
To evaluate the time complexity and overhead, we imple-
mented each deep learning task in a low-cost embedded system,
NVIDIA Jetson Nano Developer Kit [43]. For an efficient de-
ployment, we converted the Tensorflow code to TensorRT [44],
inference optimizer for NVIDIA’s embedded systems. We repeated
the tests 1000 times to calculate the average inference time. For ex-
ample, front end processing of each data sample takes 0.09 msec.
A typical frame in the 802.11ac standard is 5.484 msec. [16].
Hence, the front end processing time is measured as small as
1.6% of the 802.11 frame. The reported processing time is for
the case when there is already data available to be processed. As
the performance of the off-the-shelf hardware can be degraded
when there are other processes (such as other WiFi operations)
running in the background, we used the stress-ng software
[45] to stress test the memory use of the embedded GPU by
generating background processes emulating high load conditions.
We observed that the processing time for deep learning opera-
tions increased 33% but remained small relative to MAC frame
length. Note that the overhead and processing times on embedded
platforms can be further reduced by customized ASIC chips and
FPGAs.
For the signal classification task, we observed that the FNN
model takes 0.009 msec on average to predict each sample point.
On the other hand, the CNN model takes 0.035 msec to predict a
sample over 1000 repetitions. As a comparison between the FNN
and CNN models, both architectures have similar performance.
Since the CNN architecture has more layers, it takes approxi-
mately four times longer to process a single waveform in inference
time. CNNs in return have a smaller footprint on the hardware.
Note that the difference in hardware footprint is expected since
the FNNs use fully connected layers to reduce dimensions from
one layer to another, whereas the CNNs employ convolutional
layers that utilize feature maps in a sliding window manner. For
more discussion on the number of parameters in FNN and CNN
models, we refer the reader to [33, p. 357].
For the signal authentication task, the MCD outlier detection
takes 0.0556 msec, one-class SVM takes 52.813 msec, and
isolation forest takes 33.521 msec.
Adding these components, we observe that the overall pro-
cessing overhead for the front end processing, signal classification
using FNN, and signal authentication using MCD is 0.1546 msec,
which is only 2.8% of the 802.11ac frame.
For the routing overhead, the backpressure algorithm ex-
changes typical messages as in the regular distance-vector routing
algorithms. There is no closed form expression for the number
of message exchanges and the exact number depends on the
network and traffic conditions. The backpressure algorithm was
implemented with SDRs in [46] that empirically evaluated the
number of message exchanges.
8 CONCLUSION
We presented the DeepWiFi protocol that applies machine learn-
ing, and in particular deep learning to adapt WiFi to spectrum dy-
namics and provides major throughput gains compared to baseline
WiFi and another jamming-resistant MAC protocol. DeepWiFi
is designed to mitigate out-of-network interference effects from
probabilistic and sensing-based jammers. Built upon the PHY
transceiver chain of IEEE 802.11ac, DeepWiFi provides the deci-
sion parameters to WiFi transceiver without changing the PHY and
the MAC frame format. DeepWiFi applies deep learning-based
autoencoder to extract features and applies deep neural networks
(FNN or CNN) to classify signals as WiFi, jammed, or idle.
The signals classified as WiFi are further processed through RF
fingerprinting that identifies hardware-based features by machine
learning and authenticates legitimate WiFi signals. Using these
signal labels on sensed channels, DeepWiFi supports users to
use idle channels, back-off on channels used by legitimate WiFi
signals, and access (if needed in the degraded mode) channels that
are occupied by signals other than legitimated WiFis. DeepWiFi
users optimize their transmit powers for LPI/LPD and their MCS
to maximize link rates, and their routing decisions by backpres-
sure algorithm. We simulated DeepWiFi in a distributed network
using the channels and signals generated by MATLAB WLAN
Toolbox. We showed that DeepWiFi helps WiFi users sustain their
throughput with major performance gain relative to baseline WiFi
and another jamming-resistant MAC protocol especially when
channels are likely to be jammed and the SINR is low.
APPENDIX
8.1 Other Dimensionality Reduction Techniques
In addition to an autoencoder, we have also tested the separability
of the noise, WiFi, and jamming signals using other dimensionality
reduction methods such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
[27] and t-distributed stochastic neighbor embedding (tSNE) [28].
We conclude that these techniques cannot separate signal types of
interest. The PCA method is an orthogonal linear transformation
that converts the data into a new coordinate system that is defined
by the principal coordinates [27]. The first component of the PCA
can be found by solving
w1 = arg max
wTXTXw
wTw
. (11)
This term is also called as the Rayleigh quotient and the maximum
is attend at the largest eigenvalue of the matrix XTX . The other
components of the PCA are found using a similar procedure but by
subtracting the effects of the previous components. For example,
to calculate the kth PCA component, k − 1 PCA components are
subtracted from X before solving (11). Thus, we first perform the
subtraction
Xˆk = X −
k−1∑
j=1
Xwjw
T
j , (12)
and then solve
wk = arg max
wT XˆT Xˆw
wTw
. (13)
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First, we use PCA to reduce the dimensions to two, N = 2.
Figure 18 illustrates the distributions of three signal types. We
observe that WiFi signal is distributed along the two eigenvector
directions, whereas the jammer and noise is clustered around the
origin. Next, we increase the dimension size to three, N = 3 and
try to see if they are separated in 3-dimensions. Figures 19 and 20
illustrate the distributions for three components N = 3. Figure 19
demonstrates all three types of points on top of each other whereas
Figure 20 plots each type in a different plot. We observe that
while the WiFi signal is well distributed in three dimensions, the
jamming and noise signals are clustered in smaller values (in a
horizontal plane around x ∈ [−10, 15] and y ∈ [−20, 5]) which
makes it hard to distinguish. We conclude that WiFi and jamming
signals are not linearly separable and PCA is not a good candidate
to differentiate the clusters for these three signal types.
Figure 18: Dimensionality reduction to 2 features using PCA.
Figure 19: Dimensionality reduction to 3 features using PCA. All
signal types are plotted in the same figure.
Next, we try another commonly used dimensionality reduction
technique called t-SNE. Unlike PCA, t-SNE uses the joint prob-
abilities between data points and tries to minimize the Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence between the joint probabilities of the low-
dimensional embedding and the high-dimensional data [28]. The t-
SNE method first computes conditional probabilities pj|i between
the input data
pj|i =
exp(−||xi − xj ||2/2σ2i )∑
k 6=i exp(−||xi − xk||2/2σ2i )
. (14)
Figure 20: Dimensionality reduction to 3 features using PCA.
Three signal types are individually plotted.
Figure 21: Dimensionality reduction to 2 features using t-SNE.
Figure 22: Dimensionality reduction to 3 features using t-SNE.
Then,
pij =
pj|i + pi|j
2N
, (15)
where N denotes the number of sample points. Let z1, ...,zN
denote the representations of the input dataset in the reduced
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(a) FNN
(b) CNN
Figure 23: Cross-entropy loss and accuracy of both architectures
for signal classification.
dimensions such that zi ∈ Rd where d denotes the dimensions
to be reduced to. In this case, we evaluate for d = 2 and d = 3.
The similarity of the representations zi and zj in d-dimensions is
qij =
(1 + ||zi − zj ||2)−1∑
k 6=i(1 + ||zi − zk||2)−1
. (16)
Using these similarity measures, the t-SNE method employs the
KL divergence of the reduced dimension distribution Q from the
data distribution P and solves
KL(P ||Q) =
∑
i 6=j
pij log
(
pij
qij
)
. (17)
The KL divergence is used as a cost function in t-SNE.
We apply the t-SNE method to reduce the dimensionality of
WiFi and jamming signals, while the noise is kept aside for this
study for visual clarity. While t-SNE is particularly well suited
for visualization of high-dimensional dataset, Figures 21 and 22
demonstrate that WiFi and jamming signals are not separable with
a smoothline between clusters. Thus, we do not use the t-SNE.
8.2 Signal Classification
As discussed in Section 5.3, the generated dataset is divided into
80% training and 20% testing. We provide the accuracy and loss
functions of both FNN and CNN architectures for the training and
test sets in Figures 23(a)-(b). The results in these figures validate
that the final model does not suffer from overfitting or underfitting.
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